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Introduction
For more than twenty years, Bosnia-Herzegovina has been a prominent case in the
peacebuilding literature, a benchmark by which other conflict-ridden societies have been
evaluated or compared to. Its significance in the realm of peacebuilding and state making stems
from several interrelated factors. First, the Bosnian War began at the threshold of a Post-Cold
War era when new international rules were in the process of being formed. The Bosnian war
shattered the European peace architecture that had emerged after World War II resulting in
frantic efforts by the international community to create an alternative conceptual framework
that later became known under the moniker of liberal peacebuilding (Mac Ginty 2011;
Campbell, Chandler, and Sabaratnam 2011; Newman, Paris, and Richmond 2009).

Second, the daily coverage by major international news agencies and the TV images of the siege
of Sarajevo and ethnic cleansing brought home to North American and European households
the realities of the Bosnian War. Even though an effective international peace-making campaign
took years to put together, pressure by Western publics to “do something” was present from
the first days of the war in the Spring of 1992. Moreover, the sheer brutality of the war that left
close to 100,000 people dead in three and half years (Tokaca 2018; Guzina and Marijan 2013)
raised questions about the actual costs of peace and the limits of peacebuilding operations in
the supposedly liberal world order.

For all these reasons, the entire first generation of post-Cold War scholars, humanitarian
workers, and policy analysts have been heavily influenced by the Bosnian peacebuilding
experience. Indeed, it is hard to find an edited collection of chapters or a monograph on

peacebuilding that does not refer to the international involvement in Bosnia-Herzegovina. In
general, there are two schools of thought on the case of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Foreign policy
makers and pragmatically oriented scholars are quick to praise the stability brought about by
the newly created, internationally orchestrated power-sharing structures in Bosnia-Herzegovina
(Tonge 2014; Durch 2006). From this perspective, one of the central achievements of the
Dayton Peace Agreement (also known as Dayton Peace Accords) that brought an end to the war
in Bosnia-Herzegovina is the lack of violent conflicts in more than twenty years. A more critically
oriented scholarship instead argues that Bosnian peacebuilding offers a cautionary tale where
the prescribed goals of liberal peacebuilding have produced a political system based on rigid
power-sharing, lack of local ownership, disempowered citizenship, and a deeply fractured civil
society (Merdzanovic 2017; Richmond 2014; Donais 2012).

Bosnia-Herzegovina is an ideal case study for understanding the complexities of post-Cold War
conflict resolution. The chapter provides an overview and an evaluation of the lessons that can
be drawn from the Bosnian peace process. More specifically, it addresses the following
questions: how can the Dayton peace process be evaluated from the perspective of the past
twenty-some years? Can Bosnia-Herzegovina be genuinely upheld as the "gold standard” of
peacebuilding? And, does Bosnia-Herzegovina lend itself to easy comparisons?

Conflict analysis
The descent of Bosnia-Herzegovina into fratricidal war should be situated within a broader
context of the geopolitical transformation sparked by the implosion of the global communist
system. Without the changes in the geopolitical map of Europe, it is doubtful that Yugoslavia
would have collapsed, and Bosnia-Herzegovina would have ended up in war. One of the central
tenets of the European Cold-War structure has been the critical role played by the former
Yugoslavia as a bridge between the liberal West and the communist East. With the implosion of
the Soviet Union and the bloodless revolutions in Eastern Europe, the need of the international
community for such a bridge disappeared, leaving Yugoslav actors in the position to pursue
their respective policies without regard for the broader implications of their actions.
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Serbian President, Slobodan Milosevic, Croatian President, Franjo Tudjman, and Chairman of
the Presidency of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Alija Izetbegovic each relied on nationalist ideology to
legitimise their respective political agendas. In particular, Milosevic’s orchestration of the socalled anti-bureaucratic revolution in Serbia, in a series of mass rallies across the republic,
allowed him to bypass both the Serbian and Yugoslav constitutions and to undermine the
territorial autonomy of the multi-ethnic Serbian provinces of Vojvodina and Kosovo (Ramet
2006; Popov 1996). Milosevic sought to unify Serbs living within Croatia and BosniaHerzegovina; both regions had a substantial percentage of local Serbs (according to the last
Yugoslav Census in 1991, Serbs constituted 12.2 percent of the population in Croatia, and 31.4
percent in Bosnia-Herzegovina). Likeminded Tudjman also sought to carve up BosniaHerzegovina and incorporate those areas with a substantial Croat majority (in particular,
Western Herzegovina) into Croatia. Izetbegovic, on the other hand, was never able to attract
Bosnian Serb or Croat allegiances; his legitimacy was deeply rooted in the Bosnian Muslim
constituency.

Unfortunately, a peaceful dissolution of a multinational federation in the context of the former
Yugoslavia was only possible in regions that were ethnically almost entirely homogenous.
Slovenia, with a tiny percentage of non-ethnic Slovenians, was the only republic that fulfilled
this condition. Thus, after brief skirmishes with the Yugoslav Army (the so-called Ten Days War
for Independence from 27 June to 7 July 1991), the Yugoslav military withdrew, and Slovenia
effectively became an independent state. In all other cases, the dissolution of the multinational
one-party federal state would not only fail to open the door to peaceful self-determination and
democratic transition but would also bring bloody wars to Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and
Kosovo.

The European Economic Community’s (EEC; as of 1993, European Community – EC) initial
strategy centred around the recommendations of the Arbitration Commission of the
International Conference on Yugoslavia (the so-called Badinter Commission) set up on 27
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August 1991 to provide the Conference with legal advice. The EEC’s Badinter Commission set
forth criteria based on principles of liberal democracy including widespread support for
independence through democratically organised referenda and protection of national minority
rights. Once these criteria were fulfilled, the regions could legitimately secede and establish
themselves as independent states. But, the Commission also applied the post-colonial principle
of uti posseditis, which effectively legitimised and imposed Yugoslav provincial borders as the
borders of those newly emerging states (Caplan 2005; Radan 2002). This principle was not
acceptable to Serbia and local Serbian leadership in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. Their
interpretation of the principle of self-determination was as belonging to the people rather than
to territories. Accordingly, they sought to redraw regional borders in their fight for selfdetermination by any means necessary.

The case of Bosnia-Herzegovina, in particular, exemplifies the tensions and limits of the
Commission’s recommendations. The republic was divided among three national communities,
none of which had full majority status. Bosniaks (as of 1993, the historical term used to refer to
Bosnian Muslims) were the most numerous comprising 43.7 percent of the population
according to the 1991 Census. Bosnian Serbs accounted for 31.4 percent and Croats 17.3
percent of the population (Burg and Shoup 1999: p. 27). To secure representation and peace
within the region, the Bosnian Constitution declared all three groups as collectively the
founding nations in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and thus no one group could be treated as a minority.
The constitution also ensured that the combined majority vote of two ethnic groups would not
undermine, nor impose decisions on the third national community in the country.

Be that as it may, following the Badinter Commission’s ruling, Bosnia-Herzegovina held a
referendum on the question of independence that took place on 29 February and 1 March
1992. By then, Bosnians of all ethnic stripes were caught in a circle of escalating violence and
deep mistrust. Even before Bosnia’s recognition as an independent state, Bosnian Serb forces,
with the support of the Serbian Army (then, still operated under the official name of the
Yugoslav Army) engaged in aggressive military actions against Bosniaks and Croats (Hoare 2007;
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Ramet 2006). When the referendum was finally organised, Bosnian Muslims and Croats voted
overwhelmingly in favour of independence, while Bosnian Serbs boycotted it. Despite the
constitutionally problematic character of the vote, the Bosnian Muslim politician, Alija
Izetbegovic, as the Chairman of the Presidency of Bosnia-Herzegovina, declared independence
on 6 April 1992. Ironically, this date came to represent the birth of a new state, but also the
formal beginning of the war. The following day, both the United States and the EEC nominally
committed themselves to the unity of Bosnia-Herzegovina by recognizing it as a new European
state. While doing so, they underestimated the ethnic divisions pervading the region.

In response, Bosnian Serbs intensified military campaigns and laid a three-years-long siege of
Sarajevo, which became a symbol of the entire Bosnian war. Bosnian Serb military and political
objectives in the ensuing conflict were made public from the very beginning; if a Serbdominated Yugoslavia was not possible, the second-best solution was to establish a territory of
their own. Already on 7 April 1992, Bosnian leaders in the Bosnian Serb stronghold of Pale
declared the creation of Republika Srpska (RS) within Bosnia-Herzegovina. On 12 May, during
the session of the assembly of the RS in Banja Luka, the Bosnian Serb leader, Radovan Karadzic,
announced that the “belt along the Drina [the river separating Serbia and Bosnia-Herzegovina]
must basically belong to Serbian Bosnia-Herzegovina” (qt. in Karcic 2015). At the same
assembly, the delegates adopted Karadzic’s “Six Strategic Objectives of the Serbian People in
Bosnia and Herzegovina” (the document was later published in the Republika Srpska’s Official
Gazette on 26 November 1993). The most strategic objective was a proposal to delineate a new
state that would connect the corridors of all “Serb territories” into one coherent area. In other
words, as early as April 1992, Bosnian Serb leaders officially inaugurated the politics of ethnic
cleansing both as a war tool and political objective. After all, according to the 1991 Bosnian
Census, there was not one single municipality at the territory that later became known as
Republika Srpska where Bosnian Serbs, Croats and Bosniaks did not live together.

In the early stages of the war, the Bosniak position was much more precarious. Faced with the
heavily armed Bosnian Serb forces, they focused their efforts on securing international support
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(from the UN, USA, EEC, OSCE, and Islamic states) for the preservation of a unified BosniaHerzegovina. Diplomatically, this proved to be a successful strategy given the international
outrage against the Bosnian Serb practice of ethnic cleansing. Yes, despite international
support, an arms embargo was imposed on all warring sides in Bosnia-Herzegovina, which
effectively precluded Bosniaks from arming themselves with heavy weaponry. Similarly,
external military assistance to Bosniak forces was not deployed until the last stages of the war.
Thus, throughout most of the war, the United Nations mission on the ground (UNPROFOR) was
best understood as peacekeeping and humanitarian intervention rather than peacebuilding. In
the words of the Bosnia-Herzegovina UNPROFOR commander, Michael Rose, “the UN was not
ready to cross ‘the Mogadishu line’ between peacekeeping and warfighting” (qt. in Cousens and
Harland, p. 57 in Durch 2006).

Bosnian Croats, the smallest of three communities, had the most difficulties in creating a
coherent strategy. They were territorially dispersed; western Herzegovina was an
overwhelmingly Croat region, yet the rest of Bosnian Croats were spread out through many
Bosnian municipalities. Herzegovinian Croats had the same objectives as Bosnian Serbs – the
creation of an exclusively Croat entity, the so-called Herzeg Bosnia. However, despite Croats’
eight-month war against Bosniaks in 1993, they failed to create a so-called third entity in
Bosnia-Herzegovina, which effectively marginalised their war efforts until 1995.

In light of the military preponderance of the Bosnian Serb forces (already by mid-1992, they
were able to control 70 percent of the Bosnian territory), the incompatible political objectives
of all three sides in the conflict, and the reluctance of the external agencies to cross “the
Mogadishu line”, all peace initiatives succumbed to what James Gow describes as “the triumph
of the lack of will” (Gow 1997). The target of Gow’s critique was international mediators, in
particular, the US dispirited interest to become more actively engaged in the peace process
until later in 1994. This lack of interest was particularly manifest with the jointly sponsored UNEEC initiative, also known as the Vance-Owen Plan in late 1992 and early 1993. Even though at
one point all three sides were in principle supportive of the programme, it was shattered by
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disagreements between the Clinton Administration and the UN-EEC representatives over the
Plan’s sustainability on the ground (Burg and Shoup 1999; Owen 1995).

In hindsight, the Plan offered a vision of Bosnia-Herzegovina that the later-signed Dayton
Accords never aspired to: an administrative division of the country into nine ethnic cantons,
each controlling policing, education and transport, albeit within the framework of a weak
unified central government. More importantly, the Plan maintained the principle of ethnic
proportionality and pushed back against the Bosnian Serbs’ objective to have contiguous
borders with Serbia. It also suggested the rolling back of Serb territorial gains by 30 percent
(Tonge 2014: p. 139; Owen 1995). Still, as Gow maintains, “the Clinton Administration
effectively destroyed the Vance-Owen plan through allegations that it rewarded aggression and
condoned ethnic cleansing” (p. 313; also, see Owen 1995). But, perhaps the most important
implication of the Plan was that it, for the first time, revealed a split in Serbian leadership. As
much as a Serbian President, Slobodan Milosevic, supported the Plan (no matter how
problematic that support might be), Bosnian Serb leaders were adamantly against it, a division
that would become ever more significant in the later stages of the war, and during the Dayton
peace talks. The apple of discord was that Bosnian Serbs did not want to give up on the
independently run Bosnian Serb territory and contiguous borders with Serbia.

Different pieces of the peace puzzle were finally put together in the summer and fall of 1995.
What accelerated the process was the UN’s failure to prevent the Bosnian Serb massacre of
Bosniaks in the UN-designated safe area, the town of Srebrenica, in July 1995 when more than
7,000 Bosnian men were killed (Nettelfield and Wagner 2013; Honig and Both 1997). The
United States was forced to act more decisively by launching the NATO air campaign, Operation
Deliberate Force, against Bosnian Serb positions. Already, a year before, the Contact Group
(comprising of USA, Britain, France, Germany, and Russia) was created, which led to the
Washington Framework Agreement of 1 March 1994. The Agreement established a joint
Bosnian Muslim and Croat Federation; it also lay the groundwork for a new Bosnia-Herzegovina
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that would include the Bosnian Muslim and Croat Federation along with the Bosnian Serb
Republic.

Ultimately, with the Croatian Army regaining control over Croatia in 1995, followed by ethnic
cleansing of Serbs from Croatia, the Bosnian Serbs’ military luck started to change in BosniaHerzegovina as well. The moment was at last ripe for a peace. No one has explained this better
than the top American negotiator, Richard Holbrooke: “the success of the Croatian (and later, in
similar circumstances, the Bosnian-Croat Federation) offensive was a classic illustration of the
fact that the shape of the diplomatic landscape will usually reflect the balance of forces on the
ground. In concrete terms, this meant that as diplomats we could not expect the Serbs to be
conciliatory at the negotiating table as long as they had experienced nothing but success on the
battlefield” (1998: p. 73). By mid-October 1995, the Serb-held territory was scaled down from
70 percent to roughly 50 percent of the Bosnian land.

The Western bombing campaign was simultaneously followed by the very successful Americaninitiated shuttle-diplomacy. First, on September 14, Milosevic and the Bosnian Serb leaders
agreed to sign the document that effectively put an end to the Bosnian Serbs’ siege of Sarajevo.
Second, by October 5, Holbrooke successfully negotiated a ceasefire that was for the first time
since the beginning of the war respected by Bosnian Serb and Bosniak forces (Pomfret 1995).
Finally, after almost four years of fighting, all sides were genuinely ready to pursue peace talks,
even though each of the warring parties entered the negotiations with radically opposing
expectations.

The conflict resolution process
The Bosnian peace talks lasted a total of 21 days from the 1st to the 21st of November 1995. At
first, the place chosen for the negotiations seemed rather peculiar – the Wright-Peterson Air
Force Base in Dayton, Ohio. This site was selected deliberately to keep the warring sides away
from the press thereby reducing the possibility of any one party outbidding the other in the
public war of words. At the end of the “lock everyone up until they reach agreement”
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(Holbrooke 1998: p. 232) style of negotiations, the General Framework for Peace with its eleven
annexes (the so-called Dayton Peace Accords), was agreed to and officially signed a month later
in Paris on 14 December. The peace process was achievable because all parties, both
international and regional powers, accepted the peace process as in their mutual interest. As
Hampson points out, peace settlements require "a combination of international and regional
strategies”, and they are always "inextricably tied to the interests of neighbouring regional
powers and their overall commitment to the peace process” (1996: p. 217).

A series of prior events (some previously discussed) laid the conditions that would allow for all
parties to come to the negotiation table. These included the creation of the Bosnian Muslim
Croat Federation a year earlier, the military defeat and the cleansing of local Serbs from
Croatia, NATO bombing of Bosnian Serb positions, and, most importantly, the American
decision to replace the Europeans and the UN as principal architects, engineers and guarantors
of the entire peace process. Furthermore, what made those talks possible was the emerging
congruence of interests between principal regional actors (Serbia and Croatia) and the United
States' strategy to address violent conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Serbia and Croatia sought
respectively to lift international sanctions against Serbia and regain control over eastern
Slavonia, an area in Croatia that was not yet firmly integrated with the rest of the country. Both
sides also gave up their resolve to carve up Bosnia-Herzegovina and, instead, began to support
institutional arrangements that will allow them to retain their interests in Bosnia-Herzegovina
(Bildt 1999; Holbrooke 1998). Moreover, both Presidents were forced into agreeing to a
political compromise; a negotiated outcome that local Serb or Croat delegations were less likely
to accept.

The peace process resembled an intricate chess game with continuous moving parts that
ultimately converged with the peace talks and the Dayton Agreement. From the very beginning
of the war, the position of external actors has been twofold – to reach permanent peace and
preserve Bosnia-Herzegovina as a multi-ethnic state. These two interrelated goals were best
integrated in the joint EC-UN initiative (the previously discussed Vance-Owen Plan) that
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revolved around preserving the multi-ethnic character of the Bosnian state by reversing the
effects of the ethnic cleansing campaign that uprooted half of the pre-war Bosnian population.
The Plan proposed dividing the country into cantons, each of which would retain demographic
diversity even though nominally identified as Bosnian Serb, Croat, or Bosniak (Owen 2013,
1995). The Americans rejected such a plan because the proposed programme of action was not
feasible, but also for the “ethical reasons” of not wanting to territorially reward the Bosnian
Serbs that the Clinton Administration perceived as aggressors in the war.

And yet, a year later, the American approach to the Bosnian war shifted in two fundamental
aspects. First, the United States actively supported the creation of the Bosnian Muslim-Croat
Federation (1994). At the same time, they also implicitly recognised the need for territorial
separation between the Federation and Republika Srpska, albeit within a federal structure that
would keep the Bosnian state formally multi-ethnic. Second, the US compromised on its initial
position regarding the delineation of borders within the country. More than a year before the
Dayton talks, the proposed border formula called for 51 percent for Bosniak-Croat territory and
49 percent for Republika Srpska; in other words, already at that time, all external actors
accepted this proposal as the most realistic as for how to end the war. However, with the US
firmly behind such a plan, this meant that American negotiators acknowledged Republika
Srpska’s contiguous borders with Serbia. By 1995, during the Dayton talks, the goal of achieving
a peace accord overshadowed any American previous ethical concerns. It would be shown later
that this effectively led to the acceptance of the ethnic cleansing as an acceptable tool in the
Bosnian war.

How should one understand such a “pragmatic” shift in the American approach to the Bosnian
conflict? Part of the answer is already provided in Hampson’s recognition that peace
settlements require that major external peace strategies should be aligned with the interests of
neighbouring regional powers and their overall commitment to the peace process. American
readiness to accept Serbia and Croatia as legitimate actors in any deal on peace in BosniaHerzegovina goes a long way to explaining the outcome of the Dayton peace talks. Belloni adds
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another dimension to the international efforts to achieve the peace. In his insightful analysis of
state building and international intervention in Bosnia-Herzegovina, he (2008) has identified
three major lessons for international peacekeepers. First, the multiple objectives of all actors
involved in conflict complicate reaching a genuinely agreed upon solution to such a conflict.
Second, contrary to the rhetoric of moral arguments, “the focus of international actors has
been to preserve stability as much as possible while neglecting the more important need for a
long-term change” (p. 5). Third, the focus on stability goes “hand-in-hand," with the
"preoccupation with visible and concrete short-term results (p. 5)”.

Once American negotiators identified peace between Serbia and Croatia as strategically
essential for the stability of the entire region, the Bosnian delegation had no choice but to
accept the agreement even though they recognised that the particulars of the deal would
undermine an integrated multi-ethnic state and, instead, result in deep ethnic divisions. Indeed,
the country that emerged out of Dayton (usually referred to as a Dayton Bosnia) is a nation that
walks a fine line between partition and reintegration. Formally, Bosnia-Herzegovina preserved
its internationally recognised borders. But, it is also internally divided in a threefold way:
administratively, ethnically, and territorially. Each of these aspects is fully elaborated upon in
Annex 4 of the Dayton Peace Accords that became recognised as a new Bosnia-Herzegovinian
Constitution.

The Dayton Agreement hinged on the ability of the international community to enforce and
oversee the peace process. It contained an additional ten annexes covering such a wide variety
of issues, ranging from military aspects and regional stabilisation (annex 1), interethnic
boundary lines (annex 2), elections (annex 3), human rights and refugees and displaced persons
(annexes 6 and 7), to civilian implementation and an international police task force (annexes 10
and 11). Each of these annexes was supported by key external implementers with a NATO-led
implementation force and the newly created Office of the High Representative. Also, especially
in the first years of Dayton Bosnia, the OSCE – Organization for Security and Cooperation in
Europe, and the UN High Commissioner for Refugees played an essential role in organising the
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first elections and in securing the framework for a safe return of refugees and protection of
human rights. Finally, even though not part of the Dayton structure, both the International
Court of Justice (ICJ) and the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY,
already created in 1993) have become central agencies through which the issues of transitional
justice and the responsibility for war crimes have been addressed.

The peace process was successful in ending the war. Within ten years, the international military
presence downsized from 60,000 to less than 6,000 troops (Cousens and Harland: pp. 83-87 in
Durch 2006). The leaders responsible for war crimes were arrested and sent to The Hague for
prosecution at the ICTY, including the former President of Serbia, Slobodan Milosevic, and
Bosnian Serb political and military leaders, Radovan Karadzic and Ratko Mladic. Moreover, a
series of post-war elections in the past twenty years were organised peacefully. Finally, the
country rebuilt its destroyed infrastructure, and it has been engaged in formal negotiations to
join the European Union (EU). In other words, the objectives that have been identified within
each of the signed annexes have been fully implemented. And yet, Bosnia-Herzegovina did not
emerge as a fully integrated, democratic, federal state. Quite the contrary, the achieved results
of international intervention are ambiguous at best.

To understand this apparent paradox, one needs to separate the international intervention in
terms of short-term, easily identifiable goals of the peace process from post-conflict
peacebuilding which requires a more ambitious project of "state making from scratch”, a
simultaneous process of rebuilding state institutions, democratic transition, and inter-ethnic
integration. Most of the achievements reflect what Belloni has described as short-term goals of
the international community’s approach to peacebuilding (Belloni 2009, 2008). The rest of this
section outlines three outstanding long-term issues that external and local actors still struggle
with, specifically, the question of local ownership; the permanent shift in the demographic
structure of Bosnian society; and the competing narratives over the responsibility for the war in
Bosnia-Herzegovina. Finally, these raise the critical question of citizens’ satisfaction with the
post-Dayton period in Bosnia-Herzegovina. A focus on these challenges underscores the limits
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of the peace process and questions the extent to which post-war peacebuilding has achieved
the presumed long-term stability of the region.

Without relying on massive international military and civil presence, Bosnia-Herzegovina would
not have achieved peace understood in terms of stability and security. The multinational troops
were employed with the primary task to secure the status quo on the ground. However, such
“realist concerns with stability merged uneasily” with the broader objectives of Dayton to
guarantee human rights protection, rebuild civic structures and reverse wartime ethnic
cleansing (Belloni 2008: p. 173). Thus, in the early years of the international engagement in
Bosnia-Herzegovina, such a stability-oriented strategy necessitated the primacy of robust
military structures (IFOR) at the expense of a strong civilian mandate from the Office of the
High Representative. Later, the roles reversed, and the OHR became overinvolved in a topdown Bosnian state and social engineering, undermining the development of a genuine Bosnian
civil society and local political structures (Donais 2017, 2005; Chandler 2000). This new strategy
of intrusive institution building was inaugurated at the Peace Implementation Council (PIC, the
organization in charge of implementing the Dayton Accords) meeting in December 1997. It
allowed the PIC to legitimise the UN High Representative’s request to use his administrative
powers and impose a solution despite strong disagreement between local Bosnian parties. The
so-called Bonn powers permitted the practice of external imposition of the rule of law in the
country thereby allowing for the dismissal of elected politicians and the external imposition of
constitutional principles, laws and regulations (Merdzanovic 2017; Caplan 2005).

Even though the Bonn powers were initially upheld as central to the future success of Bosnia,
many scholars have argued that they blocked domestic political debate on the flaws of the
Dayton Agreement. Moreover, that the external bureaucratic interventions in Bosnian affairs
worked against the very democratic principle of self-government that the Office of the High
Representative sought to achieve. The focus of such critique was in particular that the
international community imposed a “culture of dependency’’ among the local population,
resulting in a “paternalistic, authoritarian manner” by which international agencies undermined
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local grass-root incentives for more democratic involvement in politics (Chandler 2017, 2000).
In essence, the interventionist template imposed on Bosnia-Herzegovina has hollowed out the
public space for any local agencies attempting to challenge the imposed consociational system
(Donais 2017, 2012, 2005).

Another (un)intended peacebuilding outcome is the failure of external actors to address the
growing territorial fragmentation among ethnic groups that began with ethnic cleansing during
the war. Population trends suggest increased ethnic fragmentation following the war. For
instance, in 1991, what is now Republika Srpska, had a mixed population composed of 55
percent Serb, 28 Bosniak, 9 Croat, 5 Yugoslav, and 3 percent the so-called other. Census data
for 2013 reveal that Serbs increased their representation from 55 to 81 percent in this region
and Bosniaks dropped from 28 to 14 percent, and Croats to 2.5 percent. Likewise, in the
Bosniak-Croat Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, in 1991, the area was composed of 52 percent
Bosniaks, 22 Croats, 18 Serbs, 6 Yugoslavs, and 3 percent others. In 2013, in the Bosniak-Croat
parts of Bosnia-Herzegovina, 70 percent identified as Bosniaks, 22 as Croats, and 2.5 percent as
Serbs (Bosnia-Herzegovina Statistics Agency 2013).

The official 2013 Census results (the first since the 1992-1995 war) only confirm that the
legacies of ethnic cleansing remain a permanent fixture of the Bosnian state. These
demographic shifts in ethnic composition were just in part a result of the ethnic cleansing war
strategy. They were also a product of the peace agreement itself. Indeed, the Bosnian territorial
divisions, as enshrined in Dayton, rewarded the nationalist parties for their territorial feuds and
ethnic cleansing policies. Despite initial efforts to encourage refugees and internally displaced
persons to return and settle roots in their homeland, people sold their lands in favour of
moving to areas where they felt more secure among their respective ethnic majority. Hence,
rather than fostering ethnic integration in each of the cantons and within RS, the peace
arrangements intensified divisions between ethnic groups, thereby, undermining long-term
regional stability.
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A final and most damaging limitation on peacebuilding in Bosnia-Herzegovina has been the
complete failure of the international actors to challenge the competing local narratives over the
causes and consequences of the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina. This issue, more than any other,
betrays the tensions between Dayton’s short-term peace objectives and long-term goals of reintegrating Bosnian society. At the heart of this tension is the very structure of the Dayton
Accord – its territorial and institutional solutions to peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina. In particular,
it revolves around the Dayton Accords’ support for the internal territorial integrity of Republika
Srpska. But, the emerging post-war Bosniak narrative is that of being the victims of Bosnian
Serb genocide against them. On their side, Bosnian Serbs’ representation of the war is as the
fight for national self-determination and protection from possible retaliation by other
communities in Bosnia.

From the very beginning of Dayton Bosnia, Bosniaks hoped that the international community
would prosecute Bosnian Serbs for engaging in genocide in the war. Accordingly, Bosniaks were
much more interested in the genocide case against Serbia in front of the International Court of
Justice (ICJ) than in the individual cases before the ICTY (Subotic 2009). The ICJ’s decision
against Serbia would have recognised the Bosnian war as a war of aggression and resulted in
the abolition of Republika Srpska. In other words, Bosniaks hoped that the ICJ ruling would
achieve what could not have been accomplished during the Dayton negotiations. However, in
February 2007, the ICJ issued a ruling that cleared Serbia of direct responsibility for the
genocide and any complicity in the genocide that happened between 1992 and 1995. The
verdict reiterated the ICTY decision that the only confirmed case of genocide in Bosnia is the
one committed by Bosnian Serb forces in Srebrenica (Guzina and Marijan 2013).

The Court outcome intensified deep-seated tensions between these ethnic groups. It also
reinforced local public perceptions that the ICTY has done little to support or inspire
reconciliation between the communities. Instead, the joint ICJ and ICTY ruling appears to have
intensified those divisions. Or, as Meernik has put it, “[M]ore often than not, ethnic groups
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responded with increased hostility towards one another after an arrest or judgement” (2005: p.
287). In the end, there is still a widespread sense of a continuing conflict shared by Bosnians
irrespective of which community they belong to. Within the environment of the “incomplete
peace” in Bosnia-Herzegovina, “everyday peace politics” has almost naturally resulted in
conflict over the symbols and competing narratives over the causes of war (Marijan 2017). In
2018, as much as was the case in 1995, Bosniaks perceive RS as a “genocidal creation”, while for
Bosnian Serbs it is a “legitimate outcome” of the Bosnian Serbs’ struggle for the right to selfdetermination.

In the end, the identified three Dayton Bosnia’s challenges oblige every student of Bosnian
affairs to address, however briefly, two interlocked questions: whether any local agency has the
leverage and power to make necessary changes to Bosnia-Herzegovina’s political system? And,
exactly how viable is Bosnia-Herzegovina in the long term? With hindsight of more than twenty
years, the answer to both questions appears to be ambiguous at best. Despite constant
emphasis on the need for change reiterated during every single Bosnian election, the changes
in the system merely reinforce the status quo allowing “Bosnian oligarchs to stay as they are”
(Calori 2014).

The latest Bosnian election of 2014 is an excellent example of the pretext of such “changes”.
Only months prior to the 2014 elections, thousands of citizens in Bosniak majority areas took
part in massive street protests to express frustration against political and economic corruption
and the astronomic unemployment crippling the country (GDP growth rate averaged only 0.31
percent from 2009 to 2017; the average unemployment rate from 2007 until 2017 is at the
staggering 42.65 percent; and, about 150,000 young people have left their homes since the end
of the war, with 10,000 leaving every year) (Trading Economics 2018; BalkanInsight 2013). Thus,
the so-called Bosnian Spring street protest reflected deep seated dissatisfaction with Bosnian
political elites at all levels of government. However, they also revealed the territorial divisions
within Bosnia-Herzegovina, for citizens of Republika Srpska were much less prone to join the
street protests (Marijan and Guzina 2014). Only a few months after the street protests, radical
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demands for social and economic changes all but disappeared and nationalist parties resumed
their dominance in the political domain. The Bosniak, Croat and Serb nationalist parties
(respectively, SDA-Bosniak Party of Democratic Action; HDZ-Croatian Democratic Union; SNSDSerb Alliance for Independent Social Democrats) did manage to incorporate some of the
protestors’ requests for change in their political platforms, thereby, securing their triumph once
again in the 2014 general elections (the next elections are scheduled for the fall 2018).
However, these changes were minimal and did little to disrupt existing political structures that
reinforce ethnic divisions.

The Dayton plan, in part, is responsible for constraining the rise of multi-ethnic parties that
could disrupt nationalist political divisions. Bosnian party system is defined by intra-ethnic
electoral competition among parties representing a single ethnic group, typically either
Bosniak, Bosnian Serb, and Bosnian Croat, with rare cases of interethnic cooperation. And, even
when they occur, as is the case between the leaders of the two major Bosnian Serb and Croat
parties (SNSD and HDZ), such cooperation is motivated primarily by reasons of political
expediency and effort to outbid or block the third Bosniak side in its determination to change
the Dayton structure (Korzeniewska-Wiszniewska and Zdeb 2015: pp. 102-106). Overall, the
political system is designed to push voters to choose nationalist candidates as a less risky option
than voting for the moderate candidate that might shift the precarious balance imposed by
Dayton.

That said, one momentary window of opportunity occurred during the 2010 elections which
saw the rise of the Bosnian Social-democrats, and when the Social Democratic Party (SDP) rose
to power in the 2010 elections as the only genuinely cross-ethnic party in Bosnia-Herzegovina
(Korzeniewska-Wiszniewska and Zdeb 2015). However, the structure of the Dayton Agreement
entrenched the dominance of nationalist identity politics making it difficult for intra-ethnic
parties like the SDP to disrupt existing political structures. Nor was the SDP able to tackle the
significant socio-economic problems gripping the country (Bieber 2014). The SDP subsequently
suffered a crushing defeat in 2014. It is important to note that the SDP’s defeat should have
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been anticipated the months earlier because the street protest first erupted in Tuzla, an SDP
stronghold. Citizens in the area were dissatisfied with nationalist politics but saw no possibility
or hope in the SDP’s ability to challenge existing political structures. The internal fragmentation
of the SDP following the 2014 election led to the creation of a new social-democratic party, the
Democratic Front (DF). Whether this will lead to a further split within the moderate vote in
Bosnia-Herzegovina, or DF might prove to be more successful than SDP, remains to be seen.

Despite the continuing presence of nationalism and the nationalist victory in 2014, it would be
wrong to assume that majority of Bosnian citizens are supportive of their respective nationalist
parties. Apart from venting their dissatisfaction on the streets in February 2014, citizens’
protest was evident in the low voter turnout, with 46 percent of the electorate abstained from
voting. This highlights the level of political apathy among citizens, but it also reflects divisions
between those who already lost their jobs and support protests or boycott elections, versus
those who enjoy the benefits of the overinflated public sector and fear potential reforms that
might cost them their jobs (Calori 2015). For the latter, there is still something to lose, for, on
balance, a poorly paid job is still better than no job at all.

Finally, while the Dayton Agreement plays a significant role in maintaining a political structure
that reinforces nationalist ethnic divisions, this alone cannot explain the current context in
Bosnia-Herzegovina. The economic stagnation and the failure of any meaningful socioeconomic reforms cut through most of the Western Balkans and the broader area of former
communist countries (Milanovic 2014). Bosnian politicians are not the only ones in the region
that proved very capable of maintaining their position of control over their respective societies.
Similar practice is spread across the region, in particular, in Serbia, Montenegro, and
Macedonia. Nor was such development of “elastic authoritarianism” possible without the active
insistence of the EU on two-fold goals of political stability and the IMF- and World Bankinspired economic reforms (Mujanovic 2018). For many regional scholars, what has emerged
should best be described in terms of stabilitocracies. As Bieber has poignantly defined it, these
are “governments that claim to secure stability, pretend to espouse EU integration and rely on
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informal, clientelist structures, control of the media, and the regular production of crises to
undermine democracy and the rule of law” (Bieber 2018a).

The future of Bosnia-Herzegovina is tenuous at best. One possibility is the continuation of the
EU-inspired policies of support for external stability of the Western Balkans in general, and the
territorial integrity of Bosnia-Herzegovina, in particular. But this comes at the costs of a
stabilising the political system that legitimises itself by relying on the rhetoric of democracy,
while internally being supportive of ethnic tensions and identity politics. At least, this is what
many authors fear while evaluating the EU initiatives in support of the Western Balkans. Many
would like to see a renewed EU engagement in the Balkans that “could break the downward
spiral of authoritarianism and escalating crises and restore faith in the EU model” (Bieber
2018b). However, the continuing EU focus on external stability of the Western Balkans could
further legitimise a rise in autocracy in the region. Under such conditions, fragmentation
without democratisation will continue to define the events in Bosnia-Herzegovina and
elsewhere in the region.

Mujanovic, in his book, Hunger and Fury, offers an alternative scenario. Endemic poverty and
widespread corruption will eventually spark a new wave of street protests across the countries
emerging out of the former Yugoslavia, and not only in Bosnia-Herzegovina. If successful, in
Mujanovic’s words, “the popular fury will leave in its wake fresh soil from which genuinely
reformed societies may emerge” (2018: p. 174). To the extent that this outcome is possible,
Bosnia-Herzegovina and other Western Balkans states, might be finally starting to come
together and integrate their societies within the region and under the broader architecture of
the EU. The first test for those two scenarios are the upcoming 2018 Bosnian general elections.
But, one should not hold breath in favor of the alternative scenario. The experience with the
Arab Spring and the Orange Revolution has taught everybody a lesson about the resilience of
the competitive authoritarian regimes.

Lessons to be learned
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What lessons can we glean from the international involvement in Bosnia-Herzegovina? Once
peace accords are signed, a day-after brings the same uncertainties as the day-before signing
them. Short of a clear victory of one side over the other in an intra-state conflict, the former
combatants end up in the driver’s seat as to how to interpret those agreements. In other
words, a delicate and unstable compromise is usually the outcome of the peace accords. Too
often, particularly in the case of Bosnia-Herzegovina, international peace agreements obscure
the deep-seated tensions that continue to permeate societies; tensions that fuel instability in
these regions and that are always at the brink of erupting. Thus, we should not search for
generalizable, ready-made solutions that can be transferable to conflicts that were caused by
radically different circumstances. Instead, we should recognise that what peace operations
have in common are not necessarily shared lessons but shared challenges.

The best way to approach those challenges is by separating peacebuilding as a peace process
from peacebuilding as post-conflict state making. The peace process is built by achieving an
international consensus on possible steps towards peace. In the context of Bosnia-Herzegovina,
it took full three and half years before international actors agreed to act in unison. Moreover,
without an orchestrated NATO air campaign against Serb positions in Bosnia-Herzegovina in the
summer of 1995, it is doubtful that Serbian President, Slobodan Milosevic, would have reigned
in local Serb leaders on the ground and accepted the Dayton peace framework (Holbrooke
1998). International mediators were also careful not to take sides and declare a winner, despite
the atrocities perpetrated by some players. Finally, the peace process was built on the clear
understanding that no party would be rewarded with more than its "fair" share.

Post-conflict state making, however, requires a more enduring long-term process that seeks to
ensure not only stability and peace but also a democratic consolidation of post-conflict states; a
process that major external agencies and international humanitarian organisations are often illequipped or lack sustained interest to pursue. Post-conflict state making incorporates various
negotiated strategies such as security transition, political transformation, societal integration,
and economic recovery, to name a few (Castillo 2017). Security transition and internationally
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mediated political change have brought the twenty plus years of peace in the region. Albeit, the
political institutions that were envisioned in the Dayton Agreement were engineered to end the
war (Paris and Sisk 2009; Paris 2004) and required the consent of those who were fighting on
the ground. Thus they benefited most those who were directly responsible for the war in the
first place.

In sum, the international solution to the destruction of Yugoslavia’s federation and the war in
Bosnia-Herzegovina was the creation of yet another ethnic federation, that of BosniaHerzegovina. The rigidly imposed power-sharing federal structure of a Bosnian state, with its
elaborate system of regional veto powers at the expense of the federal institutions, is perilously
close in its design to the one of the former Yugoslavia. In both instances, these institutions are
overshadowed by ‘thick' ethnic tensions that underscore the entire political system. Nowadays,
as was the case twenty plus years ago, the question of Bosnian partition remains open. From
the Bosniak perspective, the Dayton Accords are just a set of documents to be changed in the
direction of building stronger central institutions. For Bosnian Serbs and Croats, with no small
help from their neighbouring kin-states (Serbia and Croatia), the Dayton is "the ceiling that
should not be further developed" (Belloni 2008: p. 42).

References, further reading and links to key primary documents
References
BalkanInsight. 2013. ‘Youth Emigration Causing Balkan “Brain Drain”’. 1 August 2013.
http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/young-people-leave-serbia-bosnia-the-most.
Belloni, Roberto. 2008. State Building and International Intervention in Bosnia. 1st ed. New
York: Routledge.
———. 2009. ‘Bosnia: Dayton Is Dead! Long Live Dayton!’ Nationalism and Ethnic Politics 15 (3–
4): 355–75.
Bieber, Florian. 2014. ‘Is Change Coming (Finally)? Thoughts on the Bosnian Protests’. 10
February 2014. http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/blog/is-change-coming-finallythoughts-on-the-bosnian-protests. Accessed 15 February 2018.

21

———. 2018a. ‘The Rise (and Fall) of Balkan Stabilitocracies’. Belgrade: CIRSD. 2018.
http://www.cirsd.org/en/horizons/horizons-winter-2018-issue-no-10/the-rise-and-fallof-balkan-stabilitocracies.
———. 2018b. ‘A Way Forward for the Balkans?’ Foreign Affairs, 6 February 2018.
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/southeastern-europe/2018-02-06/wayforward-balkans. Accessed 31 March 2018.
Bildt, Carl. 1999. Peace Journey: The Struggle for Peace in Bosnia. London: Orion Pub Co.
Burg, Steven L., and Paul Shoup. 1999. The War in Bosnia-Herzegovina: Ethnic Conflict and
International Intervention. Armonk, N.Y: M.E. Sharpe.
Calori, Anna. ‘Is There Life after the (Bosnian) Elections? Poverty as a Weapon of Mass
Destruction | OpenDemocracy’. https://www.opendemocracy.net/can-europe-makeit/anna-calori/is-there-life-after-bosnian-elections-poverty-as-weapon-of-mass-destr.
Accessed 29 March 2018.
Campbell, Susanna, David Chandler, and Meera Sabaratnam, eds. 2011. A Liberal Peace? The
Problems and Practices of Peacebuilding. London ; New York: Zed.
Caplan, Richard. 2005. Europe and the Recognition of New States in Yugoslavia. Cambridge, UK;
New York: Cambridge University Press.
Castillo, Graciana del. 2017. Obstacles to Peacebuilding. London; New York: Routledge.
Chandler, David. 2000. Bosnia: Faking Democracy after Dayton. 2nd ed. London ; Sterling, Va:
Pluto Press.
———. 2017. Peacebuilding: The Twenty Years’ Crisis, 1997-2017. Rethinking Peace and Conflict
Studies. Cham, Switzerland: Palgrave Macmillan.
Cousens, Elizabeth, and David Harland. 2006. ‘Post-Dayton Bosnia and Herzegovina’. In TwentyFirst-Century Peace Operations, edited by William J. Durch, 49–140. Washington, D.C:
United States Institute of Peace and the Henry L. Stimson Center.
Donais, Timothy. 2005. The Political Economy of Peacebuilding in Post-Dayton Bosnia.
Contemporary Security Studies. London; New York: Routledge.
———. 2012. Peacebuilding and Local Ownership: Post-Conflict Consensus-Building. Studies in
Conflict, Development and Peacebuilding 5. London; New York: Routledge.

22

Donais, Timothy A. 2017. ‘Dayton +20: Peacebuilding and the Perils of Exclusivity’.
Peacebuilding 5 (1): 7–21.
Durch, William J., ed. 2006. Twenty-First-Century Peace Operations. Washington, D.C: United
States Institute of Peace and the Henry L. Stimson Center.
Gow, James. 1997. Triumph of the Lack of Will: International Diplomacy and the Yugoslav War.
New York: Columbia University Press.
Guzina, Dejan, and Branka Marijan. 2013. ‘Local Uses of International Criminal Justice in BosniaHerzegovina: Transcending Divisions or Building Parallel Worlds?’ Studies in Social
Justice 7 (2): 245 263.
Hampson, Fen Osler. 1996. Nurturing Peace: Why Peace Settlements Succeed or Fail.
Washington, D.C: United States Institute of Peace Press.
Hoare, Marko Attila. 2007. The History of Bosnia : From the Middle Ages to the Present Day.
London ; Berkeley, Calif.: Saqi.
Holbrooke, Richard C. 1998. To End a War. New York: Random House.
Honig, Jan Willem, and Norbert Both. 1997. Srebrenica: Record of a War Crime. New York, N.Y:
Penguin Books.
Karcic, Hikmet. 2015. ‘Blueprint for Genocide: The Destruction of Muslims in Eastern Bosnia’.
OpenDemocracy. 11 May 2015. https://www.opendemocracy.net/can-europe-makeit/hikmet-karcic/blueprint-for-genocide-destruction-of-muslims-in-eastern-bosnia.
Accessed 21 March 2018.
Korzeniewska-Wiszniewska, Mirella, and Aleksandra Zdeb. 2015. BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
AND ITS POLITICAL KALEIDOSCOPE: General Elections 2014: Report. Krakow: Ksiegarnia
Akademicka.
https://www.academia.edu/17658157/BOSNIA_AND_HERZEGOVINA_AND_ITS_POLITIC
AL_KALEIDOSCOPE._General_elections_2014_report. Accessed January 17 2018.
Mac Ginty, Roger. 2011. International Peacebuilding and Local Resistance: Hybrid Forms of
Peace. Rethinking Peace and Conflict Studies. Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire; New
York: Palgrave Macmillan.

23

Marijan, Branka. 2017. ‘The Politics of Everyday Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Northern
Ireland’. Peacebuilding 5 (1): 67–81.
Marijan, Branka, and Dejan Guzina. 2014. ‘An Early “Spring” in Bosnia?’ Centre for International
Governance Innovation, February. https://www.cigionline.org/publications/early-springbosnia. Accessed 29 March 2018.
Meernik, James. 2005. ‘Justice and Peace? How the International Criminal Tribunal Affects
Societal Peace in Bosnia’. Journal of Peace Research 42 (3): 271–89.
Merdzanovic, Adis. 2017. ‘“Imposed Consociationalism”: External Intervention and Power
Sharing in Bosnia and Herzegovina’. Peacebuilding 5 (1): 22–35.
Milanovic, Branko. n.d. ‘For Whom the Wall Fell? A Balance-Sheet of Transition to Capitalism’.
Accessed 14 March 2018. http://glineq.blogspot.com/2014/11/for-whom-wall-fellbalance-sheet-of.html. Accessed 1 March 2018.
Mujanovic, Jasmin. 2018. Hunger and Fury: The Crisis of Democracy in the Balkans. Oxford:
Oxford University Press.
Nettelfield, Lara J., and Sara Wagner. 2013. ‘Srebrenica in the Aftermath of Genocide’.
Cambridge University Press. 2013.
Newman, Edward, Roland Paris, and Oliver P. Richmond, eds. 2009. New Perspectives on Liberal
Peacebuilding. Tokyo; New York: United Nations University Press.
Owen, David. 1995. Balkan Odyssey. 1st U.S. ed. New York: Harcourt Brace.
———. , ed. 2013. Bosnia-Herzegovina: The Vance/Owen Peace Plan. Liverpool: Liverpool
University Press.
Paris, Roland. 2004. At War’s End: Building Peace after Civil Conflict. Cambridge University
Press.
Paris, Roland, and Timothy D. Sisk, eds. 2009. The Dilemmas of Statebuilding: Confronting the
Contradictions of Postwar Peace Operations. 1st ed. Routledge.
Pomfret, John. 1995. ‘BOSNIAN BALANCE SHIFTED SINCE LAST TRUCE’. Washington Post, 6
October 1995. https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1995/10/06/bosnianbalance-shifted-since-last-truce/5ba7bf1e-9495-4fbb-b98b-6f65dabf809e/. Accessed 29
March 2018.

24

Popov, Nebojsa. 1996. Srpska Strana Rata : Trauma i Katarza u Istorijskom Pamćenju. Beograd:
Republika.
Radan, Peter. 2002. The Break-up of Yugoslavia and International Law. Routledge Studies in
International Law 2. London; New York: Routledge.
Ramet, Sabrina P. 2006. The Three Yugoslavias: State-Building and Legitimation, 1918-2005.
Washington, D.C. : Bloomington, IN: Woodrow Wilson Center Press; Indiana University
Press.
Richmond, Oliver P. 2014. Failed Statebuilding: Intervention and the Dynamics of Peace
Formation. New Haven: Yale University Press.
Subotic, Jelena. 2009. Hijacked Justice: Dealing with the Past in the Balkans. Ithaca and London:
Cornell University Press.
Tokaca, Mirsad. 2018. ‘Preko Osamdeset Odsto Civilnih Žrtava Su Bošnjaci’.
http://www.monitor.co.me/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=6749:mir
sad-tokaa-direktor-istraivako-dokumentacionog-centra-u-sarajevu-preko-osamdesetodsto-civilnih-rtava-su-bonjaci-&catid=4650:broj-1328&Itemid=5994. Accessed 15
February 2018.
Tonge, Jonathan. 2014. Comparative Peace Processes. Cambridge, UK: Polity Press.
Trading Economics. 2018. ‘Bosnia and Herzegovina Unemployment Rate | 2007-2018 | Data |
Chart’. 2018. https://tradingeconomics.com/bosnia-and-herzegovina/unemploymentrate. Accessed 29 March 2018.
Further Reading
Many sources have been already identified in the chapter. The suggested list represents just a
glimpse into the vast literature on the varied aspects of the war and peacebuilding in BosniaHerzegovina:
Borger, Julian. 2016. The Butcher’s Trail: How the Search for Balkan War Criminals Became the
World’s Most Successful Manhunt. Other Press.
Delpla, Isabelle, Xavier Bougarel, and Jean-Louis Fournel, eds. 2012. Investigating Srebrenica:
Institutions, Facts, Responsibilities. 1 edition. New York: Berghahn Books.

25

Hromadzic, Aida. 2015. ‘Citizens of an Empty Nation’. 2015. Philadelphia: University of
Pennsylvania Press.
Keil, Soeren, and Valery Perry. 2017. State-Building and Democratization in Bosnia and
Herzegovina. New York: Routledge.
Merdzanovic, Adis. 2015. Democracy by Decree: Prospects and Limits of Imposed Consociational
Democracy in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Stuttgart: ibidem-Verlag.
Nettelfield, Laura J. 2010. Courting Democracy in Bosnia and Herzegovina: The Hague Tribunal's
Impact in a Postwar State. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Sebastián-Aparicio, Sofía. 2014. Post-War Statebuilding and Constitutional Reform: Beyond
Dayton in Bosnia. Rethinking Peace and Conflict Studies. Houndmills, Basingstoke,
Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan.
Toal, Gerard, and Carl Dahlman. 2011. Bosnia Remade: Ethnic Cleansing and Its Reversal. New
York: Oxford University Press.
Online Resources
Census - ethnicity, nationality, religion, mother tongue (2013). Bosnian Statistics Agency. At
http://www.popis.gov.ba/popis2013/knjige.php?id=2. In 2013, Bosnia-Herzegovina has
organized the first official census since 1991 when it recorded 4.4 million citizens. 2013 data
recorded 3.8 million people living in the country.

EUFOR -European Union Force in Bosnia-Herzegovina. At
http://www.euforbih.org/eufor/index.php/about-eufor/background.

ICTY – International Crime Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia. At http://icr.icty.org. It is located in
The Hague in the Netherlands, and it had authority to prosecute individuals for serious
violations of international humanitarian law committed in the former Yugoslavia since 1991.
The United Nations Security Council passed Resolution 827 establishing the court on May 25,
1993. It officially dissolved in December 2017, but the court documents are still available.

26

Office of the High Representative. At http://www.ohr.int/?lang=en. The Office of the High
Representative (OHR) is an ad hoc international institution responsible for overseeing
implementation of civilian aspects of the Peace Agreement ending the war in Bosnia and
Herzegovina.

OSCE Mission to Bosnia-Herzegovina. At http://www.osce.org/mission-to-bosnia-andherzegovina. The Mission’s principal aim is to promote stability and reconciliation while
assisting Bosnia and Herzegovina on its path to regional political, economic and social
integration. Its activities focus on reforming systems of governance, justice and education, as
well as upholding human rights and the rule of law for all citizens.

Peace Accords Matrix (PAM), Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies, University of Notre
Dame. At https://peaceaccords.nd.edu. The PAM project hosts the largest existing collection of
implementation data on intrastate peace agreements. In addition to the wealth of information
and links to primary documents on Bosnia-Herzegovina, the PAM database is a source of
qualitative and quantitative data on the implementation of 34 Comprehensive Peace
Agreements (CPAs) negotiated after 1989.

RECOM. At http://recom.link. RECOM is a regional commission for the establishment of facts
about war crimes and other serious violations of human rights committed in the former
Yugoslavia from 1 January 1991 until 31 December 2001.

UNMIBH – United Nations Mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina. At
http://peacekeeping.un.org/mission/past/unmibh/index.html. Provides general information
about the UN mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina during its mandate (December 1995 – December
2002).

27

